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 The Latest Frege 
 
1. Opening 
 Many authors believe that the manuscripts Frege wrote in 1924–1925 are not theoretical-
ly of interest. They are rather a product of his emotional despair and theoretical dead-end 
which he reached in the last years of his life. Such is also the judgement of Michael Dummett 
delivered in his seminal book Frege: Philosophy of Language. According to Dummett, “the 
few fragmentary writings of Frege’s final period—1919–1925—are not of high quality: they 
are interesting chiefly as showing that Frege did, at least at the very end of his life, 
acknowledge the failure of the logicist programme” (Dummett 1981, p. 664). 
 In this paper we will try to show that the widely accepted negative assessment of Frege’s 
latest writings is due to a lack of understanding of their true idea. In fact, the change in Fre-
ge’s mind in the last two or three years of his life was result of long deliberations on a severe 
tension in his founding intuitions. The change itself made his logico-philosophical project 
more coherent and, thus, is of utmost theoretical importance. 
 
2. Frege’s Intuition-Dualism and its Elimination 
 The attentive reader of Frege can easily discern a striking dualism in his attitude towards 
the role of intuition in logic and mathematics. On the one hand, his objective was to construct 
a deductive system of inference free from intuition. He repeatedly said that “one may not 
appeal to intuition as a means of proof” (1881a, 32 n.). On the other hand, Frege conceded 
(on the same page) that “it is permissible to use intuition as a helpful expedient in pinning 
down [festhalten] an idea”. In fact, the whole project for a concept-script—which must also 
demonstrate how the logical proof is done—was built on the latter assumption. Frege’s task 
was to suggest a graphically perfect language, the purpose of which was to show how things 
went in logic.
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 This position implied a deflationary understanding of logic. Apparently, Frege was con-
vinced that “if our language was logically more perfect, we would perhaps have no further 
need of logic, or we might read it off [ablesen] from the language” (1915, p. 252). In the 
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 This project is not to be confused with the project for a perfectly grounded language. According to the latter 
project, “in science the purpose of a proper name is to designate an object determinately; if this purpose is unful-
filled, the proper name has no justification in science” (1906, 178).  
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Tractatus, Wittgenstein transformed this conditional into a strict deflationary understanding 
of logic: “We can actually do without logical propositions; for in a suitable notation we can in 
fact recognise the formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions 
themselves” (Wittgenstein 1922, 6.122). 
 Apparently, Frege’s concept-script presupposes spatial imagination that cab help by 
grasping logical objects. In this connection, some authors suggest that Frege’s concept-script 
conveys a “perceptual model of understanding”:  
 
Frege’s staunch semantic realism requires that the nature of human “understanding” be interpret-
ed in a manner quite analogous with the interpretation of “seeing” on the (non-intuitive) realist 
model of visual perception. (Schweizer 1991, p. 264)  
 
In fact, the very use of the concept of grasping (fassen) suggests that there is something sol-
id—a figure, a Gestalt—that is to take hold of and further to pick it up. 
 In the present paper we shall demonstrate that Frege’s controversial statements on intui-
tion are a result of the fact that he was concerned with two different types of problems. On 
the one hand, he was convinced that by thinking, there is no place for perceptual intuition. On 
the other hand, logical inference, judgement, and deduction are made when we recognise—
through a kind of intellectual intuition—some spatially organised structures. 
 
3. The Need for New Symbolism 
 Frege’s theoretical reason for the project of concept-script was that “our attention is di-
rected by nature to the outside”—to senses. So, we have no other choice but to think in sym-
bols. At least by humans, a “concept is first gained by symbolising it; for since it is, in itself, 
imperceptible, it requires a perceptible representative in order to appear to us” (1881b, p. 84). 
It is important to notice in this connection that this problem does not concern language only, 
as Dummett suggests. The whole realm of thought must be expressed in proper symbolism, 
and language is only one part of this symbolism. Incidentally, Dummett was not the first mis-
led on this point. Wittgenstein, who almost literally repeated Frege on the need to “perceptu-
ally represent” thinking, also limited the project for perfect symbolism to language.  
 Frege’s world of logic—the world of deduction—is objective but not spatial. Amongst 
its denizens are the numbers. They are concepts. “Spatial predicates are not applicable to 
them.” (1884, § 61) The same is true about concepts, about the true-values truth and false-
hood, and, of course, about logical forms. The problem is that this non-spatial world is—at 
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least by humans—of necessity to be grasped intuitively. Usually, we make this by the way of 
using language. The language, however, is not invented in order to accomplish scientific, 
exact purposes. That is why we must invent and introduce an appropriate, more felicitous for 
our intuition symbolism. 
 Frege saw this task as his main priority. His motive was the conviction that  
 
without the great invention of symbols which call to mind that which is absent, invisible, . . . the 
course of our ideas cannot gain its freedom from this: it would still be limited to that which our 
hand can fashion, our voice intone. (1881b, p. 83)  
 
On the contrary, “if we produce the symbol of an idea which a perception has called to mind, 
we create in this way a firm, new focus about which idea gather.” (Ibid., pp. 83–4) 
 It remained unclear, however, what the theoretical ground of Frege was to assume that an 
intuitive representation of the non-spatial world of logic is possible at all. How exactly do 
symbols with certain spatial characteristics, call up in our mind something invisible? Is this a 
process of decoding? If yes, according to which rules is this deciding made? Even more puz-
zling is Frege’s assumption that precisely the spatial order of logical signs should demon-
strate the logical order of logical objects. 
 In what follows we will see that, in real fact, Frege had no grounds for this presupposi-
tion. Realising this, in the last two, or three years of his life, he adopted the view that logical 
signs and objects are of the same order—of spatial order. 
 
4. The Spatial Character of the New Symbolism 
 Frege’s idea was that the concept-script should serve for “perspicuous [anschauliche] 
representation of the forms of thought” (ibid., p. 89). It should be nothing but an optical in-
strument with the help of which we could grasp the logical forms without much ado. These 
very forms are nothing but shapes (gestalts) that can be “generally sharply defined and clearly 
distinguished” (ibid., p. 87). The perspicuity of symbolism is to be achieved through the spa-
tial relations of the symbols. This motivated Frege to advance the baroque symbolism of his 
concept. It was an expression of his conviction that  
 
the spatial relations of written symbols on a two-dimensional writing surface can be employed in 
far more diverse ways to express inner relationship than the mere following and preceding in 
 4 
 
one-dimensional time. . . . In fact, simple sentential ordering in no way corresponds to the diver-
sity of logical relations through which thoughts are interconnected. (Ibid.) 
 
 Actually, the whole concept-script of Frege is built referring to spatial relations: 
  
(i) The sign for assertion consists of a content stroke and judgement stroke. Since the 
content stroke denotes the one-levelled combination (interweaving) of ideas (Vor-
stellungen),
2
 it is symbolised by a horizontal stroke. The act of assertion that intro-
duces into judgement another dimension, that of the will, is symbolised by a verti-
cal stroke (1879, § 2).  
(ii) Two propositions are connected by conditional stroke (Bedingungsstrich). Their al-
ternative value is symbolised via posing two content strokes one above the other. 
The conditional stroke relates these opposite contents.  
(iii) The generality is expressed by way of concavity which comes to symbolise that it 
treats singular terms intensionaly. This way of symbolising accepts that the logical 
constants must show how they operate; they cannot be defined. 
(iv) Also the most elementary operation in Frege’s logic are made recognizable through 
their spartial properties. Thus Frege maintained that “where logic is concerned, it 
seems that every combination of parts results from completing something that is in 
need of supplementation [Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit]” (1919, p. 254). A typical ex-
ample here is the concept of function. The “need of supplementation” by functions 
is denoted by clearly intuitive means: it is expressed by the space within the brack-
ets in f (   ) (1924, pp. 271–2).  
  
 We can conclude that all the four most basic operations of Frege’s logic are ineffable. 
 
5. Frege’s Begriffsschrift as Ideography 
 Apparently, Frege’s program for conceptual notation is nothing but an ideography—an 
organ on for a graphical representation of ideas. Some of his colleagues, who closely fol-
lowed him, correctly understood this point. So Peano projected a “construction of graphic 
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 Incidentally, the interweaving of ideas in judgement, as well as of objects in states of affairs (Sachverhalt) is 
expressed by Russell graphically with the “ )(  ” sign in the blue-print to the famous “On Denoting”—“On Fun-
damentals” (1994), and also in a paper published shortly afterwards: “The Theory of Implication” (1906). 
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symbolism, or ideography, capable of representing all the ideas of logic” (Peano 1973, p. 
190). He insisted that this symbolism is not merely a tachygraphy. Russell also adopted a 
program for correct graphical representation of logic. Principia Mathematica offers  
 
a symbolism especially designed to represent the ideas and processes of deduction which occur 
in [it]”. It “aids the intuition in regions too abstract for the imagination readily to present to the 
mind the true relation between the ideas employed” (Russell and Whitehead 1910, p. 2) 
 
 In fact, the very etymology of Frege’s term “concept-script” (Begriffsschrift) shows that 
this was a project for an ideography. It was not a new means for extra-spatial reasoning but a 
two-dimensional representation of ideas. Frege, namely, borrowed it from Trendelenburg 
(1856), and Trendelenburg knew it from Carl Hindenburg’s “combinatorial school”.3 The 
latter, in turn, coined the term Begriffsschrift on the model of the French term ideographie 
which was introduced at the end of the eighteenth-century by D’Alambert and Condillac. 
Finally, Frege’s Begriffsschrift is conventionally translated in French as Idéographie.4 It can-
not be a surprise that Frege’s Begriffsschrift is translated in French as Idéographie. 
 Frege was convinced that his Begriffsschrift is nothing but a further development of the 
symbolism already adopted in science and mathematics. The signs in mathematics, for exam-
ple, express specific contents. “What [they] still lack is the logical cement [Mörtel] that will 
bind these building stones firmly together.” (1881a, p. 13) The cement (logic) and the bricks 
(scientific/mathematical concepts and theories), however, lie in one, spatially ordered world. 
Something similar is true about the language of chemistry. 
 Much of the success of this kind of program depends on how the symbols of the perfect 
language are designed. Importantly enough, it was precisely on this point that Frege failed. 
His specific script—the baroque notation of Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze (The Basic 
Laws of Arithmetic)—failed to persuade the readers. The new form of symbolism was not 
adopted by the logicians—also by those who were most sympathetic to his logical concep-
tions. Russell, for example, preferred Peano’s notation, highly appreciating it precisely for its 
advantages in representing. 
 Wittgenstein was perhaps the only logician who tried to develop Frege’s symbolism fur-
ther. This is clearly seen in Tractatus 6.1203, where he suggested an “intuitive method” for 
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 See, for example, Hindenburg (1803). 
4
 Cf. Frege (2000). 
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recognising an expression as tautology. Unfortunately, it was not adopted by his numerous 
acolytes. Be this as it may, the later Wittgenstein did not reject it. He used it with confidence, 
for example, in his lectures of 1935 (see his 1979a, p. 136). This shows the theoretical im-
portance of that idea.  
 
6. Frege’s Geometrical Turn in 1923 
 Main claim of this paper is that exactly this implicit spatial stance of Frege’s logic urged 
him to adopt at the end of his life the geometrical foundation of mathematics, and more pre-
cisely, the geometrical nature of mathematical objects. We must bear in mind, however, that 
Frege realised the geometrical origin of mathematics (and philosophy) only after long delib-
erations. Only towards the end of his days he saw that the “infinite in the genuine and strictest 
sense of the word” follows from the geometrical source of knowledge (Frege 1924, p. 273). 
 Perhaps what made Frege realise the intuitive character of logic was the stress laid on the 
geometrical character of Frege’s own logical symbolising by Wittgenstein during his last visit 
to Jena in December 1912 and December 1913. Here one must be reminded of Ruben Good-
stein’s report that Wittgenstein once told him. By his first discussion on logic with Frege, 
apparently, the visit in December 1912, the latter “wiped the floor with him”. Wittgenstein 
returned to England very disheartened, but a year later he [Wittgenstein] sought another in-
terview with Frege and this time “he wiped the floor with Frege” (Goodstein 1972, p. 272). 
Peter Geach, who was told only the first part of the anecdote, was convinced (Anscombe and 
Geach 1961, p. 130) that its second part is “spurious” (Geach 1988, xiv). If we have in mind 
Geach’s pro-Fregean biases, this assessment is not a surprise. Against it it can be pointed out 
that, as matter of fact, Wittgenstein communicated the story to Goodstein more than 12 years 
earlier (in 1931–5) than to Geach (1945–7). It is reasonable to expect that Goldstein’s story, 
delivered much earlier than this of Geach, is the correct one. 
 Peter Hacker believes that the decisive turn in the Frege–Wittgenstein discussion came 
after the Dec. 1912 visit of Wittgenstein (see Hacker 1996, p. 307). A reason for this is his 
letter to Russell from 26 December 1912, which reads: 
 
I had a long discussion with Frege about our Theory of Symbolism of which, I think, he roughly 
understood the general outline. He said he would think the matter over. (1974, p. 17; italics add-
ed). 
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 We have good grounds to surmise, however, that Wittgenstein succeeded in intriguing 
Frege (if not in ultimately persuading him) in the inconsistency of his logical theory by his 
third visit to him in December 1913. We can guess the content of their discussion from the 
fact that immediately after they met in Jena again, Wittgenstein formulated the doctrine of 
“logical showing” in this form: “In ‘aRb’, ‘R’ is not a symbol, but [the geometrical fact] that 
‘R’ is between one name and another symbolises” (1979b, p. 109). In fact, this was the main 
innovation in the “Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore”, which cannot be found in “Notes on Log-
ic” dictated in September 1913. 
 Unfortunately, Frege, who (for example, in his letter from September 16, 1919) hoped 
“to find something by you [Wittgenstein] what makes complete what I already found. . . to 
learn to see with your eyes,” (Frege 1989, p. 21) was much slower in catching the point of 
this lesson. Only after 1923 (after he received Wittgenstein’s Tractatus just printed) did he 
found the courage to radically change his philosophy of mathematics in accordance with 
Wittgenstein’s remarks. Realising that his concept-script has a spatial character, Frege now 
adapted the view that the (mathematical) operations it presents are geometrical. Only now 
was Frege’s logic free from its fatal dualism. Its main point became the expressed assumption 
that both philosophical and mathematical knowledge have geometrical sources. The mathe-
matical deduction is based on intuition. 
 
7. Logical Showing 
 An advantage of the interpretation presented in this paper is that it suggests a new, per-
spicuous treatment of the, otherwise, enigmatic theory of “logical showing” adopted by both 
Frege and Wittgenstein. I the Tractatus, Wittgenstein often insisted that the logical properties 
of symbols “show themselves”; that they are ineffable. More than twenty years ago Peter 
Geach demonstrated that there are also ineffable points in Frege’s logic (1976). About the 
same time, the same way done by Peter Hacker (1975). 
 The interpreters of Frege and Wittgenstein find the theory of “logical showing” paradox-
ical; a “dialectical matter” (Gabriel 1991). They also face insurmountable difficulties by try-
ing to specify why exactly is it valid. Thus Geach claims that it comes to light only “when we 
reflect upon logic” (ibid, p. 56), and Gabriel—by making “categorical differences”. 
 In contrast, according to our interpretation, both Frege and Wittgenstein maintained that 
what cannot be said in logic, but is shown in it, are its main concepts: judgement, function, 
logical constants. It follows that if we are good enough in fixing the shape (Gestalt) of think-
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ing—the perfect symbolism—then the whole discipline of logic would become superfluous. 
The perfect logical symbolism suggested will not be merely “a [sum of] ‘winks’ with the help 
of ‘pictorial expressions’,” as some authors suggest (Gabriel 1991, p. 84), but a thoroughly 
“perspicuous representation” of human thought.5 
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5
 First variant of this paper was presented at the 3rd International Conference held by the German Society for 
Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Munich, Germany, September 15–18, 1997. Thanks go to Volker Peckhaus and 
Kurt Wuchterl for helpful criticism.  
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